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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the more significant remedial developments during the
twentieth century was the rise and (partial) decline of the structural
injunction in which courts, usually federal courts, restructure or reshape
legislative or administrative agencies such as schools or prisons.
Conceptually, structural remedies appear to be inconsistent with the
judicial function. Indeed, well established rules of equity suggest that courts
should be reluctant to issue injunctions in cases that present continuing
supervision problems.2 Supplementing these general equitable principles
* Professor of Law & Distinguished University Scholar, University of
Louisville, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law.
2. See, e.g., Grossman v. Wegman’s Food Mkts., Inc., 350 N.Y.S.2d 484, 485
(App. Div. 1973) (“[C]ourts of equity are reluctant to grant specific performance in
situations where such performance would require judicial supervision over a long period
of time.”); see also DAN B. DOBBS, 2 DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-
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are the notions that the federal government should show comity towards
the actions of state officials3 and that judicial power should be separate
from legislative and executive power.4
Despite these concerns, federal courts have entered structural relief in
an extraordinary array of cases that have dramatically reshaped society,
directly regulated state governments, and routinely involved courts in
issuing orders that involve continuing supervision problems.5 Indeed,
courts have restructured school districts,6 and regulated the running of
prisons,7 jails,8 and institutions for the sick9 and the mentally disabled.10
RESTITUTION 348–53 (2d ed. 1993).
3. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971) (explaining notion of
comity as traditional respect for state functions); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 551–
56 (1946) (refusing to grant requested relief because the issue was a political question for
the state).
4. In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 210 (1888) (stating that courts of equity should
not “invade the domain . . . of the executive and administrative department[s] of the
government”).
5. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 99 (1995) (holding that while there
are no limits to the duration of a court’s supervision of a school district, a district court
must return the school district to local control as soon as the constitutional violation is
remedied); Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 380–81 (1992)
(containing a discussion of the importance of district courts being able to modify decrees
to account for changes in circumstances between the parties); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S.
467, 471 (1992) (holding that a district court may discontinue supervision over some
discrete aspects of school administration); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248–49
(1991) (describing the constitutional concerns regarding the continuation or termination
of injunctive relief in desegregation cases).
6. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 534–35, 542 (1979)
(upholding an appellate decision requiring desegregation and reversing the district
court’s opinion); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 453–55, 468 (1979)
(affirming a district court’s enjoining a school district from discriminatory practices and
ordering a systemwide desegregation plan); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744–45,
753 (1974) (reversing and remanding to the district court with instructions to hold that all
segregation found in Detroit schools be eliminated), aff’d, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 21 (1971) (explaining, inter alia,
that district courts should continue to observe school districts to ensure that
desegregation orders are followed); Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 529, 535 (1st
Cir. 1976) (affirming a district court’s ruling changing a school’s leadership in
conjunction with a desegregation plan).
7. See, e.g., French v. Owens, 538 F. Supp. 910, 927–28 (S.D. Ind. 1982) (issuing
an order that had twenty-two specific provisions regarding the day-to-day management
of a prison), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000);
Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 383 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (holding that the penitentiary will
not be allowed to confine convicts in the future unless conditions improve), aff’d, 442
F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
8. See, e.g., Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1140, 1152–54 (S.D. Miss.
1977) (ordering, inter alia, that a state institution for delinquent boys was enjoined from
a number of specific methods of behavioral control and requiring the institution to
submit proposed remedies for a number of deficiencies in its various programs); Rhem v.
Malcolm, 432 F. Supp. 769, 770, 788–89 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that the Manhattan
House of Detention may not resume operation until previous court orders are sufficiently
complied with).
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Courts have even mandated state apportionment schemes11 and
reorganized city governments.12 Understandably, these decrees have
generated much controversy.13
This Article examines the structural remedy and offers some reflections
on its appropriate use.
II. THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRUCTURAL REMEDY
The development of structural remedies is generally attributed to the
United States Supreme Court’s holding in Brown v. Board of Education
(Brown I).14 In that litigation, although the Court held that the Topeka,
Kansas school district was illegally segregated, the Court was unwilling
to order immediate desegregation. Instead, the Court adopted a slow
moving approach and deferred a remedy until its decision in Brown II.15
The Court ordered the district to end segregation with “all deliberate
speed.”16 As a result, the immediate effect of the decision was to leave
black students in the same classrooms as before with no change in
conditions.
9. See, e.g., Levy v. Urbach, 651 F.2d 1278, 1283–84 (9th Cir. 1981) (reinstating
the plaintiffs’ claims for hazard pay after working with persons afflicted with leprosy).
10. See, e.g., N.Y. State Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp.
752, 758, 768–70 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (requiring a school for the mentally retarded to
implement a number of institutional changes immediately and submit periodic reports
regarding the school’s progress); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 499 (D. Minn.
1974) (holding that the district court may use a flexible concept of due process to
determine the plaintiffs’ rights and set the baseline of minimally adequate treatment),
aff’d, 525 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1975); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth,
334 F. Supp. 1257, 1258, 1266–67 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (issuing a series of preliminary orders
designed to ensure an adequate education was provided to all mentally retarded
children), adopted, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
11. See White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 796–97 (1973) (deciding which
congressional reapportionment plan should be used for state elections); 67th Minn. State
Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187, 195 (1972) (holding explicitly that judges possess the
power to reapportion state legislature districting when the legislature’s statutory
decisions are unconstitutional); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 161–63 (1971)
(reversing the district court’s reapportionment based on inappropriate grounds, but
affirming the principle that courts may order redistricting when appropriate).
12. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 402–03 (S.D. Ala. 1976) (creating
a new city government plan that provided a realistic opportunity “to elect blacks to the
city governing body”), rev’d, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
13. See Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable
Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978).
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter Brown II].
16. Id. at 301.
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Many believe that the Court had no choice but to go slow in Brown.
Had the Court ordered an immediate end to segregation, it would have
encountered massive resistance17 and might have encouraged white
flight, leading to the closing of public schools throughout the South.18
For an institution like the United States Supreme Court, dependent as it
is on public respect as well as on the willingness of public officials to
follow its decisions, such consequences might have been devastating.
Accordingly, in Brown II, the Court played for time and did nothing to
enforce Brown II’s “all deliberate speed” mandates for many years.
Even as late as the mid-1960s, many black children were still attending
segregated schools.19
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education20 signaled an
end to the Court’s go slow approach. In Swann, although the trial court
allowed school officials to submit three separate and distinct desegregation
plans, the trial court rejected all three plans as constitutionally inadequate.
In frustration, the trial court decided to desegregate the school system
itself, based on the advice of an outside consultant. In the decade that
followed, the federal courts entered structural orders in a number of
school desegregation cases.21 Some of the orders were sweeping in
17. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE
29–30 (1998):
The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown II reflected the justices’ understanding
that they were initiating a social revolution. The Court feared that because
deeply entrenched Southern attitudes and institutions were completely
unprepared for immediate desegregation, anything more than a gradualist
approach would inevitably lead to violence. As it turned out, [the Court’s
approach] probably encouraged violence by allowing enough time for
opposition to desegregation to build while holding out hope that the decision
could be reversed. . . .
. . . [The decision] also encouraged Southern public officials to claim that
they were performing their legal duties whenever they refused to integrate
facilities because there was a threat of violence.
18. See Lino A. Graglia, The Brown Cases Revisited: Where Are They Now?, 1
BENCHMARK 23, 27 (Mar.–Apr. 1984):
There can be little doubt that if the Court had ordered the end of segregation in
1954 or 1955 the result would have been the closing of public schools in much
of the South, about which the Court could have done nothing. The principal
impact would have been on poor blacks, and Brown could have come to be
seen as a blunder and symbol of judicial impotence.
19. See JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 1124 (9th
ed. 2001) (“[O]nly 2.14% of black students in the eleven ‘southern states’ attended
schools in which they were not the racial majority.”).
20. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
21. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 78–80 (1995) (explaining the
district court’s complex remedial plan’s considerable expenses and difficult goals);
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 453, 455 (1979) (enjoining the school
district from continued discriminatory practices); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 739
(1974) (explaining the district court’s order designed to include areas of predominantly
white population within the school district to end substantial racial segregation), aff’d,
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scope. As one commentator noted, the school desegregation decrees
fundamentally remade American schools in virtually every way:
Brown was said to require nothing less than the transformation of “dual school
systems” into “unitary, nonracial school systems,” and that entailed thoroughgoing
organizational reform. It required new procedures for the assignment of
students; new criteria for the construction of schools; reassignment of faculty;
revision of the transportation systems to accommodate new routes and new
distances; reallocation of resources among schools and among new activities;
curriculum modification; increased appropriations; revision of interscholastic
sports schedules; new information systems for monitoring the performance of
the organization; and more. In time it was understood that desegregation was a
total transformational process in which the judge undertook the reconstruction
of an ongoing social institution.22

Following Brown and the other school desegregation cases, orders of
similar scope were entered in the prison cases. For example, in Hutto v.
Finney,23 the federal courts were confronted by an Arkansas prison
system that they described as “a dark and evil world completely alien to
the free world.”24 Although many of the system’s facilities were
overcrowded, the prison system continued to receive large numbers of
prisoners (one facility was deemed to be overcrowded with 1000
prisoners, but was gradually allowed to increase to 1500 prisoners).
Prisoners were often subjected to punishments, including “punitive
isolation,” that the Court described as “cruel, unusual, and unpredictable.”25
The prison’s punitive isolation system placed four to eleven inmates per
cell in 8’ x 10’ cells containing only water and a toilet that could only be
flushed from outside the cell. At night, the prisoners were given
mattresses to place on the floor. However, even though some prisoners
had infectious diseases (e.g., hepatitis and venereal disease), the
mattresses were stored together in piles during the day and returned
randomly to prisoners at night. Punitive isolation prisoners received
only 1000 calories a day consisting of “grue” which the Court described
as “a substance created by mashing meat, potatoes, oleo, syrup,
vegetables, eggs, and seasoning into a paste and baking the mixture in a

433 U.S. 267 (1977); Keyes v. Sch. Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 194 (1973) (explaining the
district court’s enforcement of a remedial plan to end segregation in the school district).
22. Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3
(1979).
23. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
24. Id. at 681 (quoting Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1970)).
25. Id. at 682.
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pan.”26 Because punitive isolation prisoners were the most antisocial,
jail guards frequently used nightsticks and mace to maintain control.27
Some prisoners remained in isolation for months on end.28
In response to these conditions, the trial court imposed a number of
restrictions on the Arkansas system: it limited the number of inmates
who could be confined in each cell, required that each prisoner be given
a bunk, discontinued the grue diet, and limited isolation sentences to
thirty days.29 The United States Supreme Court upheld the trial court
order noting that Arkansas had been repeatedly notified of the
constitutional violations, but failed to remedy them. In addition, the
Court concluded that the trial court restrictions were directly designed to
remedy the problems that the trial court identified.30
If Swann can be regarded as the beginning of the structural remedy,
the decision in Missouri v. Jenkins31 represents the remedy’s zenith. In
Jenkins, the trial court found that the Kansas City, Missouri school
district was segregated. However, since the school district was more
than 68% black, it was difficult to reassign students in ways that would
create integration. Unable to sweep suburban school districts into its
decree, the court decided against additional intradistrict reassignments
because it feared that such transfers would drive nonminority students
away and decrease stability. Instead, the court decided to improve the
district’s educational programs in the hope that the improvements would
make the district attractive to nonminority students and thereby create
“desegregative attractiveness.” To this end, the Court allowed district
officials to “dream” about how to improve their system, and the court
then granted their dream by ordering the state to spend of vast sums of
money on the district. These sums included $220 million on quality
26. Id. at 683.
27. Id. at 684.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 685–88.
30. The order is supported by the interdependence of the conditions producing
the violation. The vandalized cells and the atmosphere of violence were
attributable, in part, to overcrowding and to deep-seated enmities growing out
of months of constant daily friction. The 30-day limit will help to correct these
conditions. Moreover, the limit presents little danger of interference with
prison administration, for the Commissioner of Correction himself stated that
prisoners should not ordinarily be held in punitive isolation for more than 14
days. Finally, the exercise of discretion in this case is entitled to special
deference because of the trial judge’s years of experience with the problem at
hand and his recognition of the limits on a federal court’s authority in a case of
this kind. Like the Court of Appeals, we find no error in the inclusion of a 30day limitation on sentences to punitive isolation as a part of the District
Court’s comprehensive remedy.
Id. at 688.
31. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
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education programs, $260 million on capital improvements, and nearly
$448 million on magnet schools.32
The United States Supreme Court ultimately held that the trial court
had exceeded its authority in focusing on the principle of desegregative
attractiveness, as well as in requiring the state to finance the program of
attractiveness. The Court noted:
The purpose of desegregative attractiveness has been not only to remedy the
systemwide reduction in student achievement, but also to attract nonminority
students not presently enrolled in the KCMSD. . . .
....
. . . But this interdistrict goal is beyond the scope of the intradistrict violation
identified by the District Court. . . . [T]he District Court has devised a remedy
to accomplish indirectly what it admittedly lacks the remedial authority to
mandate directly: the interdistrict transfer of students. . . .
....
The District Court’s pursuit of “desegregative attractiveness” cannot be
reconciled with our cases placing limitations on a district court’s remedial
authority. . . . [T]his rationale is not susceptible to any objective limitation. . . .
Nor are there limits to the duration of District Court’s involvement. . . .33

III. THE DECLINE OF STRUCTURALISM
Just as the school desegregation cases led to the rise in structuralism,
they have also led to some decline in the use of that remedy. In many
parts of the country, the courts have started terminating their control
over local school districts and returning those districts to the control of
local officials. For example, in Oklahoma City Board of Education v.
Dowell,34 the Court held that the Oklahoma City school district should
be released from a desegregation decree. Likewise, in Freeman v. Pitts,
the Court granted a Georgia school district local control.35
In terminating the school desegregation decrees, the Court has
emphasized the importance of returning control over school districts to
local officials and the need for judicial intervention to be of limited
duration. As the Court stated in Jenkins, “local autonomy of school
districts is a vital national tradition, . . . [and] a district court must strive
to restore state and local authorities to the control of a school system

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 76–78.
Id. at 91–100.
498 U.S. 237 (1991).
503 U.S. 467, 471 (1992).
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operating in compliance with the Constitution.”36 The Court sounded
similar themes in Freeman v. Pitts,37 noting that once desegregation has
been implemented, the impetus and need for structural decrees
diminishes.
In addition, the Court has begun to place limits on the availability of
structural remedies in the first place. The need for limitations became
quickly evident after Swann as plaintiffs began seeking structural
remedies in a diverse array of cases. In O’Shea v. Littleton,
respondents—black citizens who had been advocating for equality in
employment, housing, education, and participation in governmental
decisionmaking—began an economic boycott of local merchants
opposed to equality.38 Respondents claimed that the county magistrate
and judge had singled them out for harsh treatment because of their
advocacy as well as because of the boycott. Specifically, respondents
alleged that the judge and magistrate discriminated against petitioners by
setting higher bond requirements and jury fees in criminal cases, and by
imposing higher criminal sentences. Respondents sought an injunction
prohibiting the discrimination.39
In O’Shea, the Court concluded that respondents were not entitled to
relief. Inter alia, the Court held that none of the respondents could
satisfy the Article III case or controversy requirement. The Court
concluded that those who had been subjected to the alleged practices in
the past could not show a case or controversy because “[p]ast exposure
to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy
regarding injunctive relief, however, if unaccompanied by any
continuing, present adverse effects.”40 The Court found no continuing
effects because none of the petitioners were then serving an allegedly
illegal sentence or awaiting trial. As to those who had been unlawfully
convicted and were serving illegal sentences, the Court concluded that
judicial intervention was inappropriate because “the complaint would
inappropriately be seeking relief from or modification of current,
existing custody.”41 As to those that were then subject to criminal
proceedings, the Court found that federal intervention was inappropriate
under the Court’s prior decision in Younger v. Harris.42 Younger
announced federalism principles which suggested that federal courts
should not enjoin pending state court criminal proceedings because
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
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plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law under state law (they can raise
their constitutional claims in the state proceedings), and federal courts
should show respect for state officials and state proceedings.43
The O’Shea Court did recognize that respondents might be arrested
again, and therefore might be again subject to the illegal practices.
However, the Court found this possibility insufficient to justify judicial
intervention, noting that there was no allegation that any Illinois law was
unconstitutional on its face. As a result, the Court found that the alleged
injury was not sufficiently real and immediate since the Court was
unwilling to “anticipate whether and when these respondents will be
charged with crime and will be made to appear before either petitioner
takes us into the area of speculation and conjecture.”44 Moreover, the
Court emphasized that federalism principles militated against judicial
intervention,45 and that respondents would have numerous judicial
remedies available to them.46
43. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1971).
44. O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 497.
45. The Court has recently reaffirmed the “basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence
that courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a
criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law
and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.” [Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971).] Additionally, recognition of the need for a
proper balance in the concurrent operation of federal and state courts counsels
restraint against the issuance of injunctions against state officers engaged in
the administration of the State’s criminal laws in the absence of a showing of
irreparable injury which is “‘both great and immediate.’” [Id. at 46.]
. . . Apparently the order would contemplate interruption of state proceedings
to adjudicate assertions of noncompliance by petitioners. This seems to us
nothing less than an ongoing federal audit of state criminal proceedings which
would indirectly accomplish the kind of interference that Younger v. Harris . . .
and related cases sought to prevent. . . .
. . . An injunction of the type contemplated by respondents and the Court of
Appeals would disrupt the normal course of proceedings in the state courts via
resort to the federal suit for determination of the claim ab initio, just as would
the request for injunctive relief from an ongoing state prosecution against the
federal plaintiff which was found to be unwarranted in Younger.
Id. at 499–501.
46. And if any of the respondents are ever prosecuted and face trial, or if they
are illegally sentenced, there are available state and federal procedures which
could provide relief from the wrongful conduct alleged. Open to a victim of
the discriminatory practices asserted under state law are the right to a
substitution of judge or a change of venue, Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 38, §§ 114–5,
114–6 (1971), review on direct appeal or on postconviction collateral review,
and the opportunity to demonstrate that the conduct of these judicial officers is
so prejudicial to the administration of justice that available disciplinary
proceedings, including the possibility of suspension or removal, are warranted.
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O’Shea was followed by the holding in Rizzo v. Goode.47 In Rizzo,
respondents sued a city, its mayor, and other police officials claiming
civil rights violations and seeking sweeping relief, including the
appointment of a receiver to supervise the police department and civilian
review of police activity. The trial court entered an extensive order
imposing procedures for the handling of complaints against the police
(requiring ready availability of complaint forms, a screening procedure
for eliminating frivolous complaints, prompt and adequate investigation
of complaints, adjudication of nonfrivolous complaints by an impartial
individual or body using fair procedures, and prompt notification to the
parties regarding the outcome), mandating the revision of police recruit
manuals and rules of procedure, and requiring the maintenance of
statistical records and summaries designed to allow the court to
determine how the revised complaint process was working.48
In entering the order, the trial court recognized that respondents had
no constitutional right to improved police procedures for handling
civilian complaints, but the court imposed the order nonetheless because
violations of constitutional rights had occurred in “unacceptably high”
numbers and were likely to continue to occur absent judicial intervention.49
The trial court found that, in the absence of changed disciplinary
procedures, unconstitutional incidents were likely to continue to occur,
not necessarily with respect to the respondents, but as to other members
of the classes they represented.50
Ill. Const., Art. VI, § 15(e). In appropriate circumstances, moreover, federal
habeas relief would undoubtedly be available.
Id. at 502.
47. 423 U.S. 362, 372 (1976).
48. (1) Appropriate revision of police manuals and rules of procedure spelling
out in some detail, in simple language, the ‘dos and don’ts’ of permissible
conduct in dealing with civilians (for example, manifestations of racial bias,
derogatory remarks, offensive language, etc.; unnecessary damage to property
and other unreasonable conduct in executing search warrants; limitations on
pursuit of persons charged only with summary offenses; recording and
processing civilian complaints, etc.). (2) Revision of procedures for processing
complaints against police, including (a) ready availability of forms for use by
civilians in lodging complaints against police officers; (b) a screening
procedure for eliminating frivolous complaints; (c) prompt and adequate
investigation of complaints; (d) adjudication of nonfrivolous complaints by an
impartial individual or body, insulated so far as practicable from chain of
command pressures, with a fair opportunity afforded the complainant to
present his complaint, and to the police officer to present his defense; and (3)
prompt notification to the concerned parties, informing them of the outcome.
Id. at 365, 369–70 (quoting the district court opinion).
49. Council of Orgs. on Phila. Police Accountability and Responsibility v. Rizzo,
357 F. Supp. 1289, 1321 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff’d in part, Goode v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542
(3d Cir. 1974), rev’d, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
50. Id.
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In striking down the trial court’s order, the United States Supreme
Court invoked justiciability concepts and federalism principles. Relying
on O’Shea, the Court questioned whether respondents could show a
“real and immediate” injury because the claim depended “not upon what
the named petitioners might do to them in the future[,] . . . but upon what
one of a small, unnamed minority of policemen might do to them in the
future because of that unknown policeman’s perception of departmental
disciplinary procedures.”51 The Court found the connection too speculative.
The Court also rejected the trial court’s conclusion that relief was
appropriate based on the United States Supreme Court’s prior holdings
in Brown and Swann.52 The trial court placed great weight on the fact
that plaintiffs (respondents) showed that there was an “unacceptably
high” number of incidents of constitutional dimension (around twenty
listed incidents in a city of three million inhabitants, with 7500
policemen).53 The Court rejected the analogy to Swann noting that the
segregation imposed by law in that case had been implemented by state
authorities for varying periods of time, and the administrators and school
board members, against whom relief was sought, had been found by
their own conduct in the administration of the school system to have
violated constitutional rights. In Rizzo, the Court found that those
defendants against whom injunctive relief was directed had not deprived
the respondent classes of any rights secured under the Constitution.
Having found that the officials had committed no constitutional
violation, the Court concluded that equitable relief was inappropriate.54
In Rizzo, respondents also argued that the people have the “‘right’ to
be protected from unconstitutional exercises of police power,” which
justifies equitable intervention.55 In other words, or so they argued, the
courts should fashion “prophylactic procedures” that would minimize
police misconduct.56 The Court disagreed, noting that “the nature of the
violation determines the scope of the remedy,” and that federalism
principles militate against structural relief.57 “Where, as here, the exercise
of authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be
constantly mindful of the ‘special delicacy of the adjustment to be
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 372–73.
Id. at 377.
Id. at 373.
Id. at 377.
Id. at 377–78.
Id. at 378.
Id.
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preserved between federal equitable power and State administration of
its own law.’”58 The Court concluded that a state should be “granted the
widest latitude in the ‘dispatch of its own internal affairs.’”59 The Court
also concluded that the trial court’s decision to revamp the department’s
internal procedures “was indisputably a sharp limitation on the
department’s ‘latitude in the ‘dispatch of its own internal affairs.’’”60 In
addition, federal courts are required to be sensitive to the functioning of
state and local agencies.61
IV. REFLECTIONS ON STRUCTURALISM
In a short paper such as this, it is difficult to provide a comprehensive
evaluation of the structural remedy. For a more thorough evaluation, the
reader is referred to the many articles on the subject.62 However, a
number of observations are in order regarding the availability and use of
structural remedies over the last five decades.
First, courts can and should be reluctant to enter structural injunctions.
Structural remedies inevitably involve judges in performing nonjudicial
functions beyond the scope of their expertise and, sometimes, beyond
their assigned role.63 Courts have involved themselves to a staggering
degree, especially in the desegregation cases. As one commentator
noted, under structural decrees, courts have “exercised traditionally
58. Id. (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951)).
59. Id. at 378–79 (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 896 (1961)).
60. Id. at 379 (citations omitted).
61. Thus the principles of federalism which play such an important part in
governing the relationship between federal courts and state governments,
though initially expounded and perhaps entitled to their greatest weight in
cases where it was sought to enjoin a criminal prosecution in progress, have
not been limited either to that situation or indeed to a criminal proceeding
itself. We think these principles likewise have applicability where injunctive
relief is sought, not against the judicial branch of the state government, but
against those in charge of an executive branch of an agency of state or local
governments such as petitioners here.
Id. at 380.
62. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker:
Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43 (1979);
Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in
Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980); Fiss, supra note 22; Gerald E.
Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (1978); Robert D.
Goldstein, A Swann Song for Remedies: Equitable Relief in the Burger Court, 13 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1978); Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change:
Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265; Paul J. Mishkin,
Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949 (1978); Nagel, supra
note 13; David Rudenstine, Institutional Injunctions, 4 CARDOZO L. REV. 611 (1983).
63. See Nagel, supra note 13, at 662.
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executive functions by appointing executive and quasi-executive officers
responsible to the judiciary and by determining administrative processes
in elaborately detailed decrees.”64 In addition, courts “have exercised
legislative functions by setting policy standards for the operation of state
and federal programs, including the setting of budgetary requirements.”65
Many scholars believe that judges are no better suited to exercise
multiple powers (i.e., legislative, executive, and judicial) than any other
branch. Indeed, as James Madison argued, “if the judicial power were
joined with the legislative and executive powers, judges ‘might behave
with all the violence of an oppressor.’”66 There is much wisdom in these
arguments.
Second, as a general rule, structural remedies should be used only as a
last resort. At the federal level, the United States Constitution divides
powers between three separate and relatively distinct branches of
government. The Constitution also provides for an allocation of powers
between the federal government and state governments, and gives the
states a legitimate and important role. As one commentator noted, “the
language of the 10th amendment strongly implies that the states are
protected from the judicial exercise of legislative or executive powers.”67
As a result, local school officials, rather than courts, are charged with
responsibility for running local schools. Likewise, prison officials are
charged with running prisons. Courts are obligated to respect this
allocation of responsibilities.
Third, even if the federal courts show restraint, structural remedies
will sometimes be necessary and appropriate. In both Swann and Hutto,
although the courts found serious constitutional violations, state and
local officials did nothing to correct them. Brown and the school
desegregation cases arose during a period of hostility to school
desegregation. Had the courts not imposed structural remedies, it is
unlikely that desegregation would have occurred. Indeed, although
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 663 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 326 (James Madison) (J. Cooke
ed., 1961)).
67. Nagel, supra note 13, at 667. Nagel went on to state that the need for restraint
is especially appropriate when the federal judiciary acts against state governments: “The
substitution of government by the federal judiciary for local self-government involves
dangerous disproportionality; it sacrifices fundamental democratic values in order to
vindicate particular constitutional rights. Specific rights of specific plaintiffs are secured
by autocratic mechanisms of broad impact.” Id. at 664.
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Brown II ordered schools to desegregate “with all deliberate speed,”
most school districts did little or nothing to desegregate. In Swann,
which was decided sixteen years after Brown II, the Court still found
significant resistance to desegregation. The trial judge gave the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district three different opportunities to
submit desegregation plans, but it never submitted an acceptable plan.
In frustration, the trial court appointed an outside expert to create the
plan. Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court upheld this approach,
noting that “[i]f school authorities fail in their affirmative obligations [to
desegregate,] judicial authority may be invoked.”68
The prison cases involved similar recalcitrance. In Hutto, the trial
court began by directing the Department of Correction to “make a
substantial start” toward improving conditions, and to file reports on its
progress.69 In addition, the trial court repeatedly gave prison administrators
the opportunity to cure unconstitutional conditions.70 Only after repeated
failures did the trial court impose guidelines. Those guidelines focused
on four major issues: “improving conditions in the isolation cells, increasing
inmate safety, eliminating the barracks sleeping arrangements, and putting
an end to the trusty system.”71 When even these guidelines did not work,
the trial court entered more specific orders discontinuing the grue diet,
limiting the number of men who could be confined in a single cell,
requiring that each prisoner be given a bunk, and limiting isolation to a
maximum of thirty days.72 Absent such specific intervention, the prison
system might never have changed.
Fourth, some structural cases involve complicated questions about
when courts should defer to the decisions of local governmental
officials, and the courts must be respectful of all aspects of government
affected by their decisions. For example, in Jenkins, the trial court gave
local officials (a school board) the chance to develop the desegregation
plan, but still showed little respect for state and local officials.73 The
trial court admitted that it allowed the local school board to “dream”
about the type of school district that it desired to have, and the types of
changes that would be needed to implement that dream.74 The trial court
judge then granted the dream even though the district did not have the
money to pay for the dream, and ordered state officials to come up with

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
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the money.75 The net effect was that the Kansas City, Missouri school
district received a very large infusion of funds, but many other schools
that depended on state funding received budget cuts and suffered
mightily to finance the dreams of Kansas City officials.76 In addition,
the legislature was deprived, in significant measure, of its right to decide
how state funds should be allocated. The trial court’s decision showed a
lack of sensitivity to state budgets as well as to the need for state
officials to determine how state money should be spent.
Fifth, structural remedies should be limited to correcting the
constitutional violation. A court should make every effort to avoid a
Jenkins type effort to completely rebuild a school system at another
party’s (the State of Missouri’s) expense in pursuit of goals (e.g.,
“desegregative attractiveness”) that bear little relationship to the
constitutional injury.
Sixth, and finally, structural remedies should last no longer than
necessary. As soon as they can rectify the constitutional violation,
courts should return executive and legislative functions to those officials
responsible for exercising them. When power rightfully rests in state
and local officials, it should be returned to them as soon as possible.
V. CONCLUSION
During the last half century, the structural remedy has had a major
impact on U.S. society and has been used to effectuate sweeping
changes in schools, prisons, and other institutions. But society, courts,
and commentators have never been entirely comfortable with the structural
remedy. Structural injunctions frequently involve courts entering
decrees that involve continuing supervision problems and supervising
how state and local officials (and sometimes federal officials) do their
jobs. Many of these decrees were a necessary response to difficult
societal problems, particularly segregation.
Even though the school desegregation cases appear to be waning,
there are other areas where structural remedies remain appropriate. One
of those areas is with regard to prison litigation. In general, inmates
constitute a despised minority, many of whom have no say in the
political process because felons are deprived of their right to vote.
Moreover, taxpayers and voters often rebel against spending money on
75.
76.

Id. at 79–80.
Id. at 99.
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inmates or prisons, and some even feel that punitive prison conditions
are justified retribution against criminals. As a result, few politicians are
willing to spend money on prisons or inmates, especially in difficult
economic times (like now). Absent judicial intervention to ensure
prisoners humane conditions, prisoners are likely to be left in intolerable
conditions. Similar considerations might dictate relief for the mentally
or physically handicapped, and other groups who are less able to
advocate for their rights.
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